Virtue Without Happiness: A Critical Engagement with Aristotelian Ethics
After exploring Stoicism and its renewed presence in contemporary culture, it felt necessary to step back and look at one of the thinkers who helped shape the ethical landscape from which Stoicism emerged. Aristotle stands at the foundation of Western moral philosophy, not only as an influence on later schools, but as a philosopher whose ideas were actively debated, refined, and often rejected by them. His account of virtue, reason, and moral development provided both a framework and a point of tension for Stoic ethics.
This post is therefore not merely a historical overview of Aristotelian ethics, but an attempt to engage with it critically. Aristotle was among the most brilliant minds of the classical period, and his influence on philosophy—ancient, medieval, and modern—is difficult to overstate. At the same time, his ethical conclusions are not beyond challenge. What follows is both an introduction to his ethical thought and my own response to it, shaped by Stoicism, realism, and a belief that virtue must ultimately be lived, not merely theorized.
Who Was Aristotle
Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was one of the most influential philosophers of ancient Greece and of Western intellectual history as a whole. Born in Stagira, he studied for nearly twenty years at Plato’s Academy before founding his own school, the Lyceum, in Athens. Aristotle’s work spans logic, metaphysics, biology, politics, rhetoric, and ethics, and is marked by a systematic and empirical approach distinct from Plato’s more idealist philosophy.
In ethics, Aristotle was concerned not with abstract moral laws but with how human beings actually live and how they might live well. His ethical thought is preserved primarily in the Nicomachean Ethics, alongside the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna Moralia. Together, these works form the basis of what is now called Aristotelian (or Aristotelic) ethics.
What Were the Aristotelian Ethics
Aristotelian ethics is a form of virtue ethics, centered on character rather than rules or consequences. Aristotle begins from the claim that every human action aims at some good, and that the highest human good is eudaimonia, commonly translated as happiness or flourishing. Eudaimonia is not a feeling or momentary pleasure, but a complete life lived well.
According to Aristotle, human flourishing consists in rational activity in accordance with virtue. Virtues are stable dispositions of character acquired through habituation—we become virtuous by repeatedly performing virtuous actions. Moral virtue lies in a mean between excess and deficiency relative to us, determined by reason and practical judgment (phronesis). For example, courage lies between cowardice and recklessness, and generosity between stinginess and wastefulness.
Importantly, Aristotle held that virtue alone is not sufficient for happiness. Certain external goods—such as health, friendship, and a degree of material security—are also necessary for a fully flourishing human life. Ethics, for Aristotle, is inseparable from politics and education, since virtuous citizens must be formed within a well-ordered community.
Core Beliefs of Aristotelian Ethics
1. Every Action Aims at Some Good
“Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1 (1094a1)
Aristotle begins ethics with a teleological claim: human actions are intelligible because they are directed toward perceived goods. Even when people act wrongly, they do so under the appearance of some good. This assumption allows Aristotle to treat ethics as a rational inquiry into ends rather than as a set of arbitrary rules.
2. The Highest Human Good Is Eudaimonia
“Happiness is the highest good, since it is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.7 (1097b1)
Eudaimonia is the final end of human life: everything else—wealth, honor, pleasure—is pursued for its sake, but happiness is pursued for no further end. Aristotle understands happiness not as a subjective feeling, but as objective flourishing across a whole life. It is complete, self-sufficient, and enduring.
3. Human Flourishing Is Rational Activity
“The function of man is an activity of soul in accordance with reason.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.7 (1098a7)
Aristotle argues that to understand human goodness, we must identify what is distinctive about humans. Since reason is our defining capacity, flourishing must consist in excellent rational activity. Ethics therefore concerns how reason should govern desire, choice, and action over time.
4. Virtue Is Central to the Good Life
“Human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.7 (1098a16)
Virtue (aretē) enables reason to function well in practice. Aristotle does not equate virtue with isolated good actions, but with stable dispositions that reliably produce good action. A flourishing life is thus one in which virtuous activity is sustained and characteristic.
5. Virtue Is Acquired Through Habituation
“We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.1 (1103b1)
Moral virtue is not innate or purely theoretical; it is formed through repeated practice. Aristotle emphasizes upbringing, education, and social institutions because they shape habits from an early age. Ethical development is gradual and requires consistent effort.
6. The Doctrine of the Mean
“Virtue, then, is a mean, insofar as it aims at what is intermediate.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.6 (1106b36)
Virtue consists in finding the appropriate response between excess and deficiency, relative to the individual and situation. The mean is not a fixed midpoint, but what reason judges to be appropriate. This makes ethics flexible, context-sensitive, and resistant to rigid rules.
7. Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) Is Essential
“It is impossible to be practically wise without being good.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI.12 (1144a36)
Phronesis is the intellectual virtue that allows one to deliberate well about how to act. It bridges moral character and correct reasoning in concrete situations. Without practical wisdom, moral rules remain abstract and ineffective.
8. External Goods Are Necessary
“Happiness plainly needs external goods as well.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.8 (1099a31)
Aristotle explicitly rejects the idea that virtue alone guarantees happiness. Severe misfortune, isolation, or deprivation can undermine flourishing even in a virtuous person. Ethics therefore acknowledges human vulnerability to circumstances beyond one’s control.
9. Humans Are Political Animals
“Man is by nature a political animal.”
Aristotle, Politics I.2 (1253a2)
Human beings achieve virtue within communities, not in isolation. Laws, customs, and political institutions shape moral character and enable the good life. For Aristotle, ethics naturally leads into politics, since the state exists to cultivate virtuous citizens.
10. The Best Life Is Contemplative
“The activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems to be superior in excellence.”
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.7 (1177a12)
At the highest level, Aristotle argues that contemplation (theoria) is the most complete and self-sufficient activity. It exercises reason in its purest form and resembles divine activity. This conclusion has been widely debated, especially in light of Aristotle’s earlier emphasis on practical virtue.
How Aristotelian Ethics Shaped Modern Philosophy
Aristotelian ethics exerted a profound and lasting influence on Western philosophy. In antiquity, it shaped debates among later Greek schools, including Stoicism and Epicureanism. In the medieval period, Aristotle’s ethical thought was integrated into Christian philosophy, most notably by Thomas Aquinas, who adapted Aristotelian virtue ethics to a theological framework.
In modern philosophy, Aristotelian ethics declined during the rise of rule-based moral theories such as Kantian deontology and utilitarianism. However, in the twentieth century, virtue ethics experienced a revival, with philosophers turning back to Aristotle for an account of moral life grounded in character, practice, and human nature. Today, Aristotelian ethics informs contemporary discussions in moral philosophy, political theory, education, medicine, and applied ethics.
What makes Aristotelian ethics enduring is its focus on moral development, practical wisdom, and the complexity of real human life rather than strict moral formulas.
How Stoicism Engaged with Aristotelian Ethics
Stoicism did not simply adopt Aristotelian ethics, but it developed in dialogue with and partly in opposition to it. The founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium, was educated in Athens at a time when Aristotelian and Platonic ideas dominated philosophical discourse. As a result, Stoic ethics inherited many of Aristotle’s fundamental questions and conceptual tools.
Like Aristotle, the Stoics emphasized:
- Ethics as a matter of character and rationality
- The central role of reason in human life
- Moral progress through training and discipline
- The idea that philosophy is meant to guide how one lives
However, Stoicism diverged sharply from Aristotle on key points. Whereas Aristotle held that external goods are necessary for happiness, the Stoics argued that virtue alone is sufficient. They rejected the doctrine of the mean and instead insisted on absolute consistency with reason. Emotions, which Aristotle believed should be moderated, were treated by the Stoics as judgments to be corrected or eliminated.
In this sense, Stoicism can be seen as both a continuation and a critique of Aristotelian ethics. It accepts Aristotle’s emphasis on rational moral character while radicalizing it into a more austere and internally focused ethical system.
Conclusion
Aristotelian ethics laid the groundwork for much of Western moral philosophy by framing ethics as the cultivation of character aimed at human flourishing. Its influence extends from ancient Greek schools like Stoicism to medieval theology and modern virtue ethics. Even where later traditions rejected Aristotle’s conclusions, they did so using questions and concepts he helped define. As a result, Aristotelian ethics remains a foundational reference point for understanding moral philosophy as a practical inquiry into how human beings ought to live.
“The happy life is thought to be one of excellence; now an excellent life requires effort.”
Nicomachean Ethics I.10 (1100b10)
A Critical Review
While Aristotelian ethics offers one of the most influential and sophisticated accounts of virtue in Western philosophy, its foundational assumptions need not be accepted wholesale. I agree with Aristotle that virtue is central to the good life, that moral character is acquired through habituation, and that reason plays an indispensable role in ethical action. These elements provide a compelling framework for understanding moral development and responsibility. However, beyond these points of convergence, significant philosophical disagreements remain.
First, I reject the claim that every human action aims at some good. While actions may be goal-directed—whether consciously or unconsciously—those goals are not necessarily good in any moral sense. Human behavior often reflects opportunism, self-interest, or deliberate wrongdoing rather than a natural orientation toward the good. To assume otherwise risks moralizing intention and obscuring the darker, but empirically evident, aspects of human motivation.
Second, I dispute the identification of happiness (eudaimonia) as the highest human good. Happiness is unstable, subjective, and frequently contingent on factors beyond moral control. A life of virtue does not require happiness to justify its worth, and in fact, virtue may demand sacrifice, suffering, or dissatisfaction. I would rather affirm the intrinsic value of virtue itself than treat it as instrumentally valuable because it contributes to happiness.
Third, I remain unconvinced by Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. While flexibility and context-sensitivity have practical appeal, they also risk moral ambiguity and rationalization. I am more inclined toward stable and conservative moral standards that resist adaptation to convenience or circumstance. Virtue, on this view, is not a negotiable midpoint but a disciplined commitment to principled action.
Fourth, I reject the claim that practical wisdom and moral goodness are inseparable. History repeatedly demonstrates that individuals may act with great intelligence, foresight, and strategic rationality while pursuing deeply immoral ends. While Aristotle defines phronesis in explicitly moral terms, this conceptual fusion does not adequately reflect the realities of political power, institutional advantage, or elite self-interest.
Fifth, I depart from Aristotle regarding the necessity of external goods. In this respect, I align more closely with Stoic ethics, holding that true moral wealth resides in wisdom and virtue rather than in health, status, or social fortune. While I concede that material deprivation may constrain action, it does not negate moral worth or the possibility of ethical integrity.
Sixth, although I broadly accept Aristotle’s characterization of humans as social beings, I resist treating political life as universally essential to flourishing. Human dispositions vary widely, and not all individuals are oriented toward political engagement or communal life in the same way. Ethical theories must leave room for such variation without moralizing deviation from the norm.
Finally, I reject Aristotle’s elevation of contemplation as the highest form of life. Reason, in my view, finds its fullest expression not in detached thought but in embodied action. The best life is one in which reason and virtue are enacted consistently through deliberate choice and conduct, rather than contemplated as abstract ideals.
Taken together, these disagreements do not amount to a rejection of Aristotelian ethics, but to a selective reconstruction of it. What remains is a conception of ethics grounded in virtue, reason, and habituation, yet stripped of teleological optimism, happiness-centered justification, and reliance on external conditions. This revised framework treats virtue not as a path to fulfillment, but as a moral necessity, valuable even, and especially, in a world that offers no guarantee of happiness.